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I. INTRODUCTION
As a civil litigant or criminal defendant, one's actions, conversa-
tions, and conduct are subject to continuous, if not exhaustive, scrutiny.
There are limitations, however, on the extent to which an opponent may
delve into the details of a party's relationships with others. Historically,
common law recognized a need for evidentiary privileges, excluding
otherwise admissible, relevant, non-prejudicial, and non-confusing evi-
dence. This exclusionary practice developed for reasons wholly unre-
lated to the truth-promoting principles that the adversary system
purports to promote.' Today, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
incorporates the common law protection of certain relationships, includ-
ing, among others, the relationships between a party and his spouse, a
party and his clergy person, and a party and his psychiatrist.2 The most
1. ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
519 (1983).
2. Id. at 525. Green and Nesson characterize two groups of privileges that are
distinguishable based on the relationship between the holder and the person in whom he is
confiding. Id. They describe the first group as encompassing those privileges which protect
communicants in a professional counseling relationship, including lawyer-client, doctor-patient,
clergy-church patron, and investor-stockbroker, among others. Id. The second group of protected
relationships include those where one anticipates that a zone of privacy protects his autonomy.
According to Green and Nesson, this group includes marital privilege and the privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 525-26.
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not make the distinctions between privileges
that Green and Nesson do. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness [or] person ...shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
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hallowed and entrenched privilege, however, is that which protects a
party's relationship with his attorney.3
Any advocate retained to assist a party with litigation immediately
understands the imperative need for an attorney-client privilege. As Jer-
emy Bentham explained, "'A counsel, solicitor, or attorney, cannot con-
duct the cause of his client if he is not fully instructed in the
circumstances attending it: but the client could not give the instructions
with safety, if the facts confided to his advocate were to be disclosed."' 4
Bentham's theme resounds in more contemporary debate advocat-
ing the need for the attorney-client privilege. Principal arguments sup-
porting an unfettered privilege include: 1) a client should feel
uninhibited when disclosing to her counselor embarrassing or damaging
information that may aid her attorney in determining the best course of
action for this particular client;5 2) absent a privilege, attorneys invaria-
bly would be compelled to testify in actions in which they represent their
clients;6 and, 3) relative to discovery, very little evidence is suppressed
that is not obtained by other means.7
There are limitations upon the scope of the attorney-client privi-
lege. The United States v. United Shoe Machine Corp. court defined the
parameters of the privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privi-
lege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting
as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness [or] person ...shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
3. Id. at 535.
4. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291, at 550
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 475 (1842)). In 1946, the United States Supreme Court articulated a
similar justification:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients.
In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and
their counsel .... [Wiere [attorney-client communications or work-product] open to
opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten .... The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing.
And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1946).





strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opin-
ion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal pro-
ceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.8
Proposed Rule 503 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, although
never adopted, best defined the privilege as it exists in modem frame-
work.9 Either the client, or his attorney, may assert the privilege, t0
which affords the client the right "to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to
the client."'" If the privilege asserted is one of attorney-client work-
product pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), exclusion
is warranted if the documents are prepared in contemplation of litigation
and if they directly relate to the adversarial trial process.12 This presup-
poses that the attorney-client communications at issue were never dis-
closed to any third parties.
There are limitations on what evidence is considered privileged
under the attorney-client privilege doctrine. Proposed Rule 503(d)
expressly denies protection if the lawyer's services are "sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the
client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud
8. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). As
Professor David J. Fried cautioned, however,
[t]his definition is misleading to the extent that it implies that the party claiming the
privilege must establish that he or she did not consult an attorney "for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort." The burden of establishing a right to the attorney-client
privilege is indeed on the claimant, but the proponent of the exception has the
burden of showing the claimant's unlawful purpose.
David J. Fried, Too High a Price For Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REv. 443, 443 n.l (1986).
9. See Fried, supra note 8, at 444 (discussing how Congress codified the law of attorney-
client privilege into Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in lieu of enacting Proposed Rule
503).
Attorney work-product privilege is deemed broader than attorney-client privilege as it
encompasses any notes or documents generated in anticipation of litigation by an attorney on her
client's behalf. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.l1 (1975). Courts have deemed
some communications or work generated by an attorney as outside the scope of the attorney-client
privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 926 F.2d 1423, 1431 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 946 F.2d 893 (1991) ("As a general
rule, client identity and fee arrangements are not protected as privileged.").
10. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 503(c). Note that the attorney-client privilege concerning
communications may be invoked only by the client, whereas if attempted discovery concerns
attorney-client work product, either the attorney or the client may assert the privilege. See In re
Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980).
11. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 503(b).
12. Ferguson v. Lurie, 139 F.R.D. 362, 367 (N.D. I11. 1991).
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.. .,,3 The attorney-client privilege "takes flight if the relation is
abused" according to the Supreme Court.
1 4
One need not stretch one's imagination to identify a hypothetical
scenario depicting abuse of the attorney-client privilege. For example, a
Mafia godfather cannot expect to cloak confidential communications
with his attorney regarding an arranged payoff to a judge or public offi-
cial. Such communication facilitates the crime of bribery.
Yet, more subtle instances occur where the boundaries of "aiding"
in the commission of a crime or fraud are not as bright. For instance, the
need to defeat privilege is not as readily apparent in the following
hypothetical:
P is injured after handling a defective boating part. P sues manufac-
turer, M, and the distributor, D, separately. After winning on his tort
claims and obtaining $4 million and $5 million dollar judgments,
respectively, P settles with M and D, as well as their insurers C and
Z. During the course of the settlement negotiations, insurer C, who
also insures retailer R (who sold P the defective part), does not dis-
close his relationship with R to P during the course of litigation or at
the time of the settlement. However, P also does not sue R until after
he reaches a settlement with M, D, C and Z. At the same time, R
counterclaims against C. P and R attempt to defeat C's assertion of
attorney-client privilege over documents P and R seek to discover.
Does the sole fact that C did not disclose its insurer relationship with
P indicate an underlying fraudulent intent on the part of C?'
5
13. Proposed Rule 503 defines who, under the rule, is considered to render professional legal
services. Protected communications under the attorney-client privilege doctrine include those
between 1) the client or his representative and his lawyer or lawyer's representative; 2) the client's
lawyer and the lawyer's representative; 3) the client or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another
in a matter of common interest; 4) representatives of the client or the client and a representative of
the client; and, 5) lawyers representing the client. PROP. FED. R. EviD. 503(d); see Ferguson, 139
F.R.D. at 364.
Instances where there is no attorney-client privilege include: a) "communication relevant to
an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the
claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction"; b) "communication
relevant to an issue of breach of duty by [a] lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer"; c)
"communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an
attesting witness"; and d) "communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or
more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in
common." PROP. FED. R. EvID. 503(d).
14. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1932). Justice Cardozo further explained, "A
client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will
have no help from the law." Id.
15. This hypothetical is loosely based upon the facts of Gagne v. Ralph Pill Elec. Supply Co.,
114 F.R.D. 22, 23-25 (D. Me. 1987). In Gagne, a federal court sitting in diversity held that absent
a prima facie showing of some intent or, indeed, any intent to defraud, the crime-fraud exception
was inapplicable. The court concluded that unless evidence of the insurer's intent to conceal its
representation of the retailer existed, the exception could not operate.
[Vol. 48:259
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The crime-fraud exception to the exclusionary attorney-client privi-
lege proscribes the perpetuation of a crime or fraud under the pretext of
privilege. The exception does not operate as a tool for discovering past
wrongdoings that a client confided to his attorney. The exception thus
remains consistent with the nature of the social relationship between the
client and his counselor. As Professor Wigmore explained, the attorney-
client privilege protections "cease to operate at a certain point, namely,
where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoings, but to future
wrongdoings." 6 In order to defeat an assertion of attorney-client privi-
lege, the party seeking admission must demonstrate: 1) that the client
was engaged in and planning criminal or fraudulent conduct when he
sought the advice of counsel, or that he committed a crime or fraud
subsequent to receiving an attorney's advice; 7 and 2) that the accused
party or witness sought the assistance of counsel in furtherance of the
wrongdoing or in close relation to it. 8
II. THE CLARK LEGACY
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege has
expanded considerably since the Supreme Court's benchmark decision
in Clark v. United States 9 more than 60 years ago. It now extends to
instances where a client or a client and his attorney use the attorney-
client relationship to conceal evidence of prior crimes or fraudulent
activity. 20 Mrs. Clark was a juror who was convicted of criminal con-
tempt for providing knowingly misleading answers and false informa-
tion in response to voir dire questions. The case arose after Mrs. Clark
became the sole voice on the jury arguing for acquittal. Her insistence
resulted in a hung jury. 2' The issue in Clark concerned whether Mrs.
16. W1GMORE, supra note 4, § 2298, at 573.
17. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 691 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d
Cir. 1992); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11 th Cir.
1987).
18. Id.
19. 289 U.S. i (1932).
20. See Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Radio Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (N.D. Ill.
1987); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1227 (11 th Cir. 1987).
21. Clark, 289 U.S. at 9. Specifically, Mrs. Clark did not disclose to the court that she
previously was employed by the Foshay Company. Id. The men on trial, whose guilt Mrs. Clark
would decide, served as officers for Foshay. Id. at 7. Mrs. Clark worked for the company for only
two weeks and did not know any of the defendants personally. Id. Mrs. Clark had also been
employed with the bank with which Foshay transacted business. Id. Mrs. Clark's husband, the
bank's president, did have a personal relationship with the directors of Foshay. Id. at 7-8. When
asked about her previous employment experience and her experience with the business
community, Mrs. Clark did not disclose her relationship the Foshay Company. Id. at 8. Mrs.
Clark became a member of the jury and early in the eight-week trial articulated her empathy
toward the plight of the defendants. Id. Furthermore, she disclosed to the jury information about
the defendants banking circumstances that had not been entered into evidence. Id. Finally, after a
1993]
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Clark's comments during jury deliberations were discoverable and
whether they could be used as evidence in a perjury action against her.22
While Mrs. Clark's privileged communications with her counsel
were not questioned, Justice Cardozo wrote that the question of the dis-
coverability of comments made during jury deliberations was analogous
to the question of the crime-fraud exception, just as the privilege protect-
ing a juror and jury deliberation was tantamount to the privilege protect-
ing attorney-client communications.23 In applying O'Rourke, Justice
Cardozo found ample prima facie evidence to warrant the disclosure and
use of Mrs. Clark's comments and actions during jury deliberation: her
concealment of her employment with the defendants' company; her
close association with the defendants' banker and personal friend, her
husband; and as witnessed by a guard, her husband's visit to the hotel
where she was sequestered with the other jurors.24
The reason for the invocation of the exception cannot be arbitrary.
As Mrs. Clark's situation exemplifies, it may have been insufficient to
say that she manifested a bias without offering examples of her attempts
to conceal reasons why she was suspected of having a bias. As the court
in United States v. White25 explained, "[t]he crime-fraud exception has a
precise focus .... To subject the attorney-client communications to dis-
closure, they must actually have been made with an intent to further an
unlawful act (or a fraud)." 26 The exception may apply notwithstanding
the fact that the attorney is unaware of the intended illegal or fraudulent
nature of the attorney-client relationship.27 Indeed, application of the
exception may be appropriate in instances where an attorney, unbe-
knownst to his client, utilizes his relationship with his client to advance
a crime or fraud.28
meeting with her husband, at the jury's sequestered quarters, Mrs. Clark informed her fellow
jurors that one of the witnesses for the prosecution had perjured himself. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 12.
23. "A talesman, sworn as a juror, becomes, like an attorney, an officer of the court, and must
submit to like restraints." Id. at 12. Justice Cardozo explained, "We turn to the precedents in the
search for an analogy, and the search is not in vain. There is a privilege protecting
communications between attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused."
Id. at 15.
24. The O'Rourke court required that the prima facie case be grounded in fact. Id. (citing
O'Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 App. Cas. 581, 604). "In the record now before us the evidence of
guilt is ample, without the happenings in the jury room, to break down the claim of privilege, and
thus let in the light." Id. at 18.
25. 887 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
26. Id. at 271.
27. "The attorney may be innocent, and still the guilty client must let the truth come out."
Clark, 289 U.S. at 15; see also United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied
492 U.S. 906 (1989).
28. See In re Impounded Case (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3rd Cir. 1989) (considering
the crime-fraud exception where the alleged criminality is solely that of the law firm).
[Vol. 48:259
CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
An unsubstantiated allegation cannot serve as the basis for invoking
the crime-fraud exception.29 Justice Cardozo initiated the requirement
of a prima facie showing in Clark: "'It is obvious that it would be
absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of merely by making a
charge of fraud.' . .. To drive the privilege away, there must be ...
'prima facie evidence that [the fraud allegation] has some foundation in
fact.' "30
Clark's progeny initially reaffirmed the principle that the communi-
cations themselves may not be used in making the prima facie show-
ing.3' While the prima facie mandate of Clark has survived, recent case
law has imposed a broad range of requirements in defining a prima facie
showing 32 and prescribed procedures to follow in evaluating evidence
offered to make the showing.33 Professor David Fried observed,
[T]he courts are constantly confronted with the following questions:
(1) What quantum of evidence is necessary to overcome the
presumption in favor of the confidentiality of attorney-cli-
ent communications?
(2) Can the communication itself serve as the necessary
evidence?
(3) If so, should the determination be made by the judge after
an in camera examination of the communication?
In recent years, the courts have lowered the evidentiary standard that
the opponent of the privilege must meet to overcome the privilege
and generally have rejected any requirement that there be evidence of
29. Clark, 289 U.S. at 15.
30. Id. (quoting O'Rourke v. Dabinshire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604).
31. The Shewfelt test is the designated name for the requirement that the prima facie showing
of the fraud allegation be attributable to an independent source. United States v. Shewfelt, 455
F.2d 836 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); Fried, supra note 8, at 464 (explaining the
nominal significance of Shewfelt, which Fried argued has generally been limited to its narrow
facts). Some courts have rejected the independent source test entirely and required a prima facie
showing by looking solely at the allegedly privileged information itself. See United States v.
King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 260 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
32. Fried, supra note 8, at 462-67.
33. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Zolin serves as the high water
mark for the procedure question. The Zolin Court attempted to strike the balance between
affording opportunity to offer a prima facie showing and the need to protect privilege by requiring
that any such inspection be made in camera. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). Central
to this balance is the use of an in camera inspection of documents by a judge prior to determining
the establishment of a prima facie case. Id. at 564. But see In re Impounded Case (Law Firm),
879 F.2d 1211, 1214 (3d Cir. 1989) (arguing that if a party is not implicated in the alleged fraud,
that party's attorney may raise privilege challenges to defeat the need for an in camera review);
Dura Corp. v. Milwaukee Hydraulic Prods., Inc., 37 F.R.D. 470, 471 (1965) (holding that, in the
event of a sufficient prima facie showing of privilege, an in camera inspection is "unwarranted
prying"). But cf. A. v. District Court, 550 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1976) (holding that if a court decides to
review documents in camera, the party invoking the exception does not need to make an
independent showing).
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fraud independent of the confidential communication itself.34
While under Clark the prima facie showing constitutes the thresh-
old for the admission of traditionally protected attorney-client communi-
cations and work-product, the questions of what should be required and
what procedures are appropriate essentially dictate the applicability of
the crime-fraud exception.35
III. "THE ONLY MAJOR RECENT CASE
' 3 6
In 1989, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in United States
v. Zolin37 significantly changed the longstanding, though somewhat
eroded, Clark precedent.3 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider two questions concerning the application of the crime-fraud excep-
tion which had previously divided the Court of Appeals.39 The first
issue addressed a court's conditioning its enforcement of an Internal
Revenue Service summons upon the disclosure of the summoned infor-
mation; o the second issue considered the use of the crime-fraud excep-
tion to defeat the testimonial privilege protecting disclosure of attorney-
client information.4'
The facts of Zolin do not present the best case for the Supreme
Court to make good law as to when, how, and if the crime-fraud excep-
tion is appropriate. The Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal
Revenue Service sought to investigate the 1979 through 1983 tax returns
of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Dianetics movement and the
Church of Scientology.42 The IRS sought two tapes, purportedly privi-
leged under attorney-client privilege doctrine, which were filed with
fifty-one other documents with the Clerk of the Los Angeles County
34. Fried, supra note 8, at 461-62.
35. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions concerning ... the
existence of a privilege shall be made by the court .... In making its determination it [is] ...
bound by the rules of evidence." FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Rule 1101(c) requires: 'The rule to
respect privileges applies to all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." FED. R. EVID.
1101(c).
36. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.
1992)).
37. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 556.
41. Id. at 556.
42. L. Ron Hubbard died during the course of litigation in 1986. The Church of Scientology
and Mary Sue Hubbard intervened, becoming the only active respondents in the action. Although
Zolin, the Clerk of Superior Court, is the named respondent, he took no active part in the case.
The Church of Scientology and Mary Sue Hubbard argued that the case was moot in light of
Hubbard's death and the closure of the IRS's civil audit of his tax records for the period in
question. Id. at 557 & nn.3-4.
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Superior Court in conjunction with the case of Church of Scientology of
California v. Armstrong.43 The IRS obtained partial transcripts of the
tapes under uncertain circumstances. ' The Zolin Court, however, dis-
missed the dubious circumstances under which the IRS received access
to the tapes as not having an impact on its decision.45 After serving a
summons upon the Clerk of the Los Angeles Superior Court, the IRS
inspected and copied the materials listed in the summons, including the
tapes, on October 24, 1984.46 Some were filed under seal.47
The Church of Scientology and Mary Sue Hubbard, intervening
parties in the Armstrong case, successfully petitioned for a temporary
restraining order from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California. The order required the return of the materials and all IRS
notes reflecting their content.4" The IRS responded by petitioning the
district court to enforce the summons and facilitate the production of 12
of the sealed documents.49 The Church of Scientology and Hubbard's
widow objected, arguing that the IRS's request was in bad faith, that the
requested documents were irrelevant, and that the attorney-client privi-
lege shielded disclosure.5 °
In an attempt to defeat the privilege, the IRS asserted the tapes'
relevancy to the investigation. 51 Requesting that the district court
review the tapes in camera, the IRS proffered partial transcripts of the
tapes in question, which were purportedly legally52 obtained from a con-
fidential source.53 Rejecting Hubbard's claim of bad faith by the IRS
and employing only the quoted excerpts from the partial transcripts sub-
43. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 557-58 (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Armstrong, No. C420
153, Los Angeles Superior Court).
44. Id.
45. In footnote five of Zolin, Justice Blackmun wrote:
The IRS denied that the transcripts were made using tapes obtained from the
Superior Court or from any other illicit source. [The IRS agent] declared that "[tihe
partial transcripts were not prepared by the United States from the tapes in the
custody of the Superior Court... nor from copies of the tapes now in the custody of
the Clerk of this Court. The transcripts were obtained from a confidential source by
another Special Agent prior to the issuance of this summons. The source was not a
party to Church of Scientology v. Armstrong, . . . nor any attorney for any party in
that proceeding." As the District Court made no finding of illegality, we assume for
present purposes that the transcripts were legally obtained.
Id. at 559 n.5 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 557.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 557-58.
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mitted by the IRS, the district court determined that while the tapes
reflected past fraud, there was no extrinsic evidence that the crime-fraud
exception applied to the tapes in question 4.5  Notwithstanding the IRS's
repeated requests, the district court, adhering to the extrinsic evidence
rule and the Clark precedent, did not review the tapes in camera. s
Justice Blackmun framed the crime-fraud exception issue as:
whether the applicability of the crime-fraud exception must be estab-
lished by 'independent evidence' (i.e. without reference to the con-
tent of the contested communications themselves), or, alternatively,
whether the applicability of that exception can be resolved by an in
camera inspection of the allegedly privileged material.5 6
In weighing the practicality of historical approaches to the exception, the
Court concluded that the IRS could introduce the contents of the docu-
ments to demonstrate a prima facie case for the invocation of the crime-
fraud exception. 7 Justice Blackmun rationalized: "A per se rule that
the communications in question may never be considered [in the deter-
mination of whether there is prima facie evidence to defeat the privi-
lege] creates . . . too great an impediment to the proper functioning of
the adversary process. '58 The Court also upheld the request for in cam-
era inspection of the documents, which the Court considered permissi-
ble, though not absolutely required. 9
The question of whether to admit the substance of communications
in order to assess whether a prima facie case for the invocation of the
exception has been made is necessarily a quantitative one. In effect, the
Court condones the admission of additional substantive evidence
derived from the documentation under claim of privilege in the event
there is not enough independent extrinsic evidence to establish a prima
facie case.
After Zolin, parties attempting to defeat invocation of the attorney-
client privilege may make a quasi-prima facie showing, based upon
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 556-57.
57. Id. at 568-69.
58. Id.
59. The Court held:
A blanket rule allowing in camera review as a tool for determining the applicability
of the crime-fraud exception . . . would place the policy of protecting open and
legitimate disclosure between attorneys and clients at undue risk. There is also
reason to be concerned about the possible due process implications of routine use of
in camera proceedings. [W]e cannot ignore the burdens in camera review places
upon the district courts, which may well be required to evaluate large evidentiary
records without open adversarial guidance by the parties.
Id. at 571 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
[Vol. 48:259
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lesser extrinsic evidence,6" in order to disclose6' protected information.
The party opposing the privilege thus intends to utilize the protected
information to make a prima facie showing as to why the protected
information should be disclosed. With Justice Blackmun writing for the
majority, the Court held, inter alia, that in camera inspection could be
used when the challenging parties request in camera review and when
they "present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in
camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception's
applicability."62
The standard resembles that applied in Fourth Amendment search
and seizure cases. Specifically, a police officer must provide a judge
with "probable cause" to believe that suspected contraband can be found
at the location for which the warrant is requested.63 As Fourth Amend-
ment case law demonstrates, the probable cause standard is difficult to
define, even for the Supreme Court.' Absent more definitive guide-
lines, Justice Blackmun's standard will become as problematic over
time.
The Zolin Court intimated that even a slight offering could satisfy
its prima facie standard by stating that "[tihe threshold we set ... need
not be a stringent one."65 Such a proposition deflates the prima facie
requirement in Clark by diluting it to require some showing from which
a judge or magistrate can extract a prima facie case. The Court did note,
however, that the decision concerning whether to review the purportedly
privileged information in camera to ascertain whether a prima facie case
is supported is at the discretion of the court.66
Courts enjoy broad latitude in determining whether the lesser evi-
dentiary showing can support a reasonable belief that an in camera
60. The extrinsic evidence may be highly suspect at best, as Zolin itself exemplifies. There
was great speculation as to how or if the IRS legally obtained its information in the first place.
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 559.
61. The Court pointed out that in camera disclosure to a federal court does not constitute
disclosure of privileged material. Id. Yet, it is the court and not the finder of fact who controls
the admission of evidence in a judicial proceeding. A court is as human as the judge who sits on
its bench; disclosure to a judge alone still constitutes a disclosure. Irrespective of whether a
prima-facie case exists, the presumptively privileged item will invariably factor into the judge's or
magistrate's evaluation of other evidence, where applicable, presented during the course of
litigation.
62. Id. at 574.
63. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
64. The complexities of the issue become readily apparent when comparing Gates with other
cases like Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk), United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411 (1976) (limiting exigent circumstances), and California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
(automobile exception).
65. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
66. Id.
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review will establish the application of the exception.67 The factors that
a court should consider, according to Justice Blackmun, include, but are
not limited to, the volume of materials to be evaluated, the relevant
value of the material to the case, the likelihood the evidence will be
produced through in camera review, and how the materials fit into the
scheme of other previously admitted evidence.68
By presuming the legitimacy of the methods whereby the purport-
edly privileged materials were obtained, the Supreme Court dodged one
of the issue's threshold questions: what qualitative standards must a
litigant satisfy in order to invoke the exception? By abolishing the
"independent evidence" rule, the Supreme Court diminished some of the
safeguards Justice Cardozo imposed in Clark to establish workable
parameters for the rule. The modem trend toward increasing federal
criminal jurisdiction,69 however, elevates the importance of the quality
of the minimal showing that the party attempting to defeat the privilege
must advance. The term quality in this context can refer to: 1) the legit-
imacy and biases of the source providing the information; 2) the rela-
tionship between the information provided as the minimal showing and
the theory of fraud presented in making a case for in camera inspection;
and, 3) the accuracy of the information proffered to make that case. Jus-
tice Cardozo cautioned against the employment of fabricated or illegally
obtained information to defeat the attorney-client privilege. The Zolin
test,7" should, but does not, consider the quality of information. Such
consideration would address Justice Cardozo's concern. Given that the
Court acknowledged the issue of where the IRS derived the problematic
independent information, 71 it should have addressed the level of quality
required of the evidence, particularly if the Court diminished the Clark
safeguards for the sake of expediency. If the IRS obtained the informa-
tion used in Zolin by unauthorized, illegal means and the Supreme Court
67. Id. It is important to note that the standard of appellate review is "clearly erroneous." See
FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948).
68. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
69. Professor Fried stated that "[a]s more types of wrongdoing traditionally within the
province of the civil law are criminalized, it becomes easier to make out a case that the defendant
consulted his or her attorney in furtherance of crime." Fried, supra note 8, at 470.
70. The Zolin decision advanced a definitive "test" for invoking the crime-fraud exception.
While Justice Blackmun's opinion does suggest certain parameters-requiring a "lesser"
independent evidence standard as opposed to rejecting the Shewfelt test altogether and
acknowledging the appropriateness of the use of in camera inspection in some instances-if
Justice Blackmun did intend to set forth a definitive "test," the opinion does not address key points
that a formal test should incorporate. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563.
71. Id. at 572.
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failed to object to those methods, Justice Cardozo's fear becomes a mod-
em defense attorney's nightmare.
In considering the prima facie showing itself, Justice Blackmun
vehemently emphasized that Zolin does not address, and certainly does
not attempt to edify, questions concerning the quantitative measure of
evidence required to make a prima facie showing. Justice Blackmun
stated, "A variety of questions may arise when a party raises the crime-
fraud exception .... [W]e observe, first, that we need not decide the
quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish the applicability of
the crime-fraud exception." 72 This shift of the question presented in
Zolin typifies the Court's misidentification of the parameters for invok-
ing the crime-fraud exception. Whereas Justice Blackmun's opinion
does not deal with the quality of the information, it is crucial that the
required amount of evidence necessary to demonstrate a prima facie
case be sufficient to safeguard against claims, based upon fabricated evi-
dence, which a party advances for the purpose of exposing as much priv-
ileged information as possible. While the ultimate decision of whether
to expose the privileged information is contingent upon a federal judge's
in camera assessment of whether the crime-fraud exception applies,
each time a court entertains a motion to defeat the privilege with any
information, qualitatively acceptable or not, the court risks disclosing
privileged information that should not be disclosed to any party, includ-
ing the court.73
The in camera disclosure of documents, effected after a quasi-
prima facie demonstration based on minimal extrinsic evidence, could
evolve into an unworkable standard. The Court in Zolin asserted that,
"[in fashioning a standard for determining when in camera review is
appropriate[,] ... [w]e conclude that a lesser evidentiary showing is
needed to trigger in camera review than is required to ultimately over-
come the privilege."74 In Clark, Justice Cardozo cautioned against the
arbitrary application of the exception in the face of an allegation of
fraud. The Zolin Court's lowering of the quantitative evidentiary stan-
dard for defeating the privilege makes Justice Cardozo's point in Clark
central. In effect, a lesser evidentiary showing further facilitates the
72. Id. at 563. The Court similarly did not concern itself with the quality of information
necessary for the lesser evidentiary showing when in camera inspection is requested. The Court
simply acknowledged that the substance of the documents in question may be used to establish a
prima facie showing warranting a defeat of the privilege.
73. See supra note 61. The appointment of a special master or review by a magistrate,
functioning in a "chinese wall" capacity and responsible only for actually reviewing the
documents or materials at issue, should divert any possible prejudice that would result from the
judge's in camera review.
74. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572. The Court concluded, 'The threshold we set ... need not be a
stringent one." Id.; see also Fried, supra note 8, at 467.
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ability of a party to exaggerate claims or to raise skeptical claims of
crime or fraud.
IV. THE QUANTITATIVE ZOLIN COMPLEMENT
The procedure for ascertaining whether a prima facie case is estab-
lished to defeat attorney-client privilege is only one question with which
federal courts must contend. The February 1992 New Jersey district
court decision in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc." attempted to create a
quantitative standard to supplement Zolin's mandates related to in cam-
era review and the use of privileged documents to establish prima facie
proof.76 In adopting Zolin wholesale, the Haines court expressed its
intent to clarify guidelines for the "quantum of proof necessary to defeat
the privilege. 77
Ironically, the facts of Haines provide a strong example of an
instance where external evidence may support a prima facie showing to
invoke the crime-fraud exception without an in camera inspection.78
The court in Haines could have reached the same result by using
"independent evidence" without incorporating information obtained
from attorney-client communications.
The Haines case was a companion case to Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc. 7 9 In each case, the plaintiff sued Liggett Group, Inc., a
tobacco manufacturer, for damages to compensate for injuries sustained
by the plaintiffs while using a Liggett's product, which Liggett purport-
edly knew to be dangerous. 80 The plaintiff in Haines alleged that Lig-
gett perpetuated a public fraud when it founded a research agency, the
Council for Tobacco Research (CTR), to purportedly conduct independ-
ent research on the effects of smoking."' The tobacco industry allegedly
concealed CTR research that implicated a link between health problems
75. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.
1992).
76. Id. at 692.
77. The Haines court argued that the quantum standard should be something "other than
[Clark's) seminal, ambiguous statement: 'To drive the privilege away, there must be something to
give colour to the charge."' Id. at 691.
78. The Director of Research for CTR admitted that, on occasion, CTR researched special
projects inconsistent with the program. Id. at 688. The fact that testimonial evidence elicited in
the trial of a companion case raised grave suspicions about the legitimacy of the information
furnished by CTR to the tobacco industry's legal counsel and cloaked under attorney-client
privilege could "quantitatively" serve as a strong prima facie showing for invoking the exception.
79. See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988).
80. In Haines, as in Cipollone, the plaintiff sought damages for wrongful death, claiming that
the plaintiff's death was attributable to a design defect in the cigarette manufactured by Liggett
and Liggett's failure to market a safer cigarette. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D.
681 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1487.
81. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 686.
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and smoking.82 In fact, the CTR researched and identified other sources
that could promote the health side effects attributable to smoking.
83
A clandestine division of CTR, the "special projects division,"
assisted counsel for Liggett in defending against products liability
actions. During discovery, Liggett protected against the disclosure of
information generated by CTR by forbidding research personnel from
answering questions regarding the opinions which Liggett requested
CTR to render. Liggett claimed that it could protect such information by
virtue of the attorney-client privilege.84
Neither the court nor the attorneys in Cipollone addressed the issue
of whether the crime-fraud exception may be invoked to discover evi-
dence in support of Cipollone's assertions.85 The trial court in Cipollone
denied a motion for directed verdict, acknowledging that CTR's research
generally did not relate to the "core health issues implicated by cigarette
smoking. ' 86 During the course of the Cipillone trial, however, attorneys
for Rose Cipollone's estate adduced testimonial evidence from the
Director of Research for CTR, who admitted that the "special projects
division" would research issues that did not fit into the Scientific Advi-
sory Board's research.87 Indeed, Liggett purportedly used the research
to assist the tobacco industry in defending suits involving health risks
associated with smoking.88
The plaintiff in Haines sought discovery based upon the theory that
Liggett knew of the hazards of smoking, concealed them, and "affirma-
tively misled the public with regard to the risks of smoking."8 9 The
plaintiff argued that this last factor, defendant's affirmative misrepresen-
82. Id. at 687.
83. "Plaintiff's counsel also learned that the 'special projects' division was specifically
designed to sponsor epidemiological studies which could be of use to cigarette manufacturers in
their defense of various current and future suits against them based on the hazards of cigarette
smoking." Id. at 685.
84. "As a demonstration of the fact that CTR had obtained a dual purpose, Dr. F.G. Colby
characterized himself as 'a person wearing two hats. Number one, he was in charge of Research
& Development information; number two, he was responsive to the legal department.' . . . Dr.
Colby's lawyer directed him [']not to answer questions at his deposition when he served as an
armchair advisor to lawyers re pending litigation or threat of litigation, when he communicated to
the company, to the R & D department." Id. at 688 (quoting deposition of Dr. Colby) (citation
omitted) (alterations in original).
85. "Plaintiff's counsel indicated during the Cipillone trial that those withheld documents
might be subject to discovery on the basis of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client and
work-product privileges, but this issue was neither pressed nor resolved during the course of the
Cipollone trial." Id. at 685.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 688.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 686.
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tations to the public, constituted the alleged fraud. 90 Unlike the Zolin
case, no shadow was cast upon the quality of the information which
gave rise to the presented theory of fraud. The court determined that the
fraud allegation was properly derived from the testimony of parties asso-
ciated with CTR and the "special projects division."'
In Haines, a special master rendered an opinion as to the applicabil-
ity of the crime-fraud exception.92 The special master tagged four files
of representative documents and identified 93 them as dispositive of his
recommendation to uphold the defendant's privilege assertion with
respect to all but six documents. 94 A magistrate reviewed the tagged
documents in camera95 and ultimately rejected the plaintiffs request for
application of the crime-fraud exception to 1500 pages of "special
projects" information. The magistrate found inadequate the plaintiff's
showing under Zolin.96
The district court judge to which the plaintiff appealed the magis-
trate's recommendation reversed the recommendation and deemed the
magistrate's decision to reject application of the crime-fraud exception
clearly erroneous. 97 The district court judge reviewed the documents in
camera98 and concluded that "the evidence overwhelmingly favor[ed]
applying the crime-fraud exception in this case." 99
The court assessed the evidence and admittedly extended Zolin by
setting guidelines for the quantum of evidence necessary to invoke the
exception attempted to quantify the term "prima facie" by analyzing sev-
eral definitions of prima facie evidence of crime-fraud. t° The defini-
tions analyzed included: 1) "'evidence such as will prevail until
90. id.
91. Id. at 689.
92. Id. at 685.
93. "The documents [in question] reflect, in the main, discussions concerning the proposed
CTR projects, the progress of those projects, the possibility of recommending additional research
ideas and the application of research results to the legal theories available in defense of existing
and anticipated litigation." Id. The plaintiff agreed that the "tagged" documents were
representative of the documents they argued necessitate the application of the crime-fraud
exception. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. There was dispute among the parties as to whether the magistrate conducted an in
camera review of all of the relevant "tagged" documents. Id. at 685-86.
96. Id. at 685..
97. Id. at 692-93. Before rendering its finding of clearly erroneous, the court noted that the
magistrate's order was not contrary to law. In citing Zolin, the magistrate was generally citing the
only major recent case to "discuss the general parameters and purpose of the crime-fraud
exception." Id. at 692.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 691-92.
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contradicted and overcome by other evidence . ..";101 2) evidence
which, if believed, establishes fraud; 10 2 3) "'probable cause that the
legal department was used for purposes other than seeking and receiving
legal advice.' 11;113 and 4) "'the fraudulent nature of the objective need
not be established definitively; there need only be presented a reasonable
basis for believing that the objective was fraudulent.'"l°' The Haines
court, however, did not attempt to institute a qualitative measure into its
standard.
The Haines court held that all of the proposed standards concerning
the quantum of evidence required to satisfy the prima facie showing
were very similar.105 The court preferred to ask whether "the party
seeking discovery presented evidence which, if believed by the fact
finder, supports plaintiffs theory of fraud."10 6 Applying this standard,
the court first deemed the plaintiffs extrinsic evidence concerning the
separation of the "special projects" from the normal operations of CTR
as "highly suggestive of the public fraud which plaintiff alleges."'0 7 The
court noted, however, that the most persuasive evidence establishing the
required prima facie showing emanated from the documents them-
selves.' Applying Zolin, the Haines court reviewed the purportedly
protected documents to find a prima facie showing. Remarkably, the
court dodged the issue of whether its quantum standard could have been
satisfied by using solely independent evidence.
After entertaining Liggett's petition for writ of mandamus, the
Third Circuit directed the district court to vacate its order.109 While the
Third Circuit approved the district court's methodology, it maintained
that in evaluating a magistrate's findings with respect to whether the
crime-fraud exception applies, a district court may only consider evi-
dence presented to the magistrate. 10 The Third Circuit admonished the
101. Id. (quoting the Fifth Circuit's definition-the definition of prima facie evidence found in
Black's Law Dictionary).
102. Id. The court explained that this definition was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Id.
103. Id. at 692 (quoting In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1982)). The court
cites the Second Circuit standard, which explained that "probable cause" is effectively the same as
"prima facie showing." Id. at 692 ("'Both require that a prudent person have a reasonable basis to
suspect the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime or fraud, and that the
communications were in furtherance thereof.'") (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984)).




107. Id. at 694.
108. Id. at 695.
109. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992).
110. Id. at 93-94.
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district court for considering information derived from the lower court's
familiarity with the Cipollone case; this information was never provided
to the magistrate. 1" The Third Circuit, in deciding what it termed "the
most agonizing aspect of the case,"' 12 found the appearance of partiality
in the district judge's decision, based partly upon the introductory
paragraphs of the district judge's opinion and the ensuing media scrutiny
of the judge's conclusions.
1 13
Approving the district court's application of a more lenient stan-
dard for in camera review, the Third Circuit thoughtfully distinguished
between evaluating a minimal showing for purposes of seeking an in
camera review and utilizing the information reviewed in camera for a
prima facie showing regarding application of the crime-fraud exception.
Highlighting the Zolin Court's failure to distinguish between the two,
114
the Third Circuit explained:
[T]he objectives of the two proceedings are completely different.
One merely seeks in camera examination of documents by the court;
this is a comparatively non-dispositive procedural way station. The
other seeks to break the seal of a highly protected privilege ....
For in camera inspection, it would be sufficient for the district
court, in its discretion, to consider only the presentation made by the
party challenging the privilege. The court may decide on this sub-
mission alone whether a factual basis is present to support a good
faith belief by a reasonable person that the materials may reveal evi-
dence of a crime or fraud. . . .Deciding whether the crime-fraud
exception applies is another matter.
1 15
The Third Circuit clarification is extremely useful because it emphasizes
the distinction between the minimal extrinsic showing required to sup-
port in camera inspection for purposes of making a prima facie showing
and actual assessment of whether the exception applies.
Much confusion surrounds the distinction between the standards
and procedures for the minimal extrinsic showing required to obtain in
camera review and those required for the application of the crime-fraud
exception. In In Re Grand Jury Investigation, the Ninth Circuit cor-
rected a district court's error in articulating these standards." 6 The
lower court, which denied a request to review documents in camera,
111. Id.
112. Id. at 97.
113. The Third Circuit, while articulating its collective belief that the distinguished Haines
district court judge was not impartial, concluded that "it is impossible for us to vindicate the
requirement of 'appearance of impartiality'" and directed that Haines be reassigned at the district
level. Id. at 98.
114. Id. at 96 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 n.7 (1989)).
115. Id.
116. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1992).
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required a factual showing supporting a good-faith belief that the crime-
fraud exception applied. Maintaining that the standard employed by the
lower court was too stringent, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless upheld the
district court's decision denying in camera review. 1 7 After evaluating
the record, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the party attempting to
defeat the privilege failed to make any sufficient showing under the
Zolin minimal threshold requirement, thereby rendering the lower
court's application of the incorrect standard harmless error."'
In assessing whether the government in In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion satisfied its burden for a Zolin showing, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the notion that the defendant corporation's decision to add a blood test to
its requirements served as extrinsic evidence of a criminal scheme war-
ranting an in camera review of attorney communications concerning the
implementation of the new testing procedure.' 19 Whereas the district
court viewed the government's showing as completely lacking, the
Ninth Circuit, and presumably courts in similar situations, did not need
to question the qualitative merit of the evidence offered as a minimal
extrinsic showing.
The Haines facts posed a slightly different problem than those in In
re Grand Jury Investigation. The Third Circuit in Haines evaluated
quantitatively the merits of the showing presented to the magistrate.
While the Third Circuit's opinion in Haines defined standards that mag-
istrates and trial courts should employ procedurally and substantively in
assessing whether materials should be considered for crime-fraud pur-
poses, both courts failed to recognize the need for standards regarding
the types of information that may be presented by the party challenging
the privilege. Theoretically, any showing that is slightly more substan-
tial than that made in In re Grand Jury Investigation could satisfy the
requirement without consideration as to the origins or credibility of the
"minimal" evidence presented.
V. POST-PRIMA FAciE SHOWING
The Third Circuit adamantly maintained that, after a prima facie
showing has been made, the party asserting the privilege must be
granted a hearing on why the exception should not apply. 120 The court
expressed that "where a fact finder undertakes to weigh evidence in a
proceeding seeking an exception to the privilege, the party invoking the
privilege has the absolute right to be heard by testimony and argu-
117. Id. at 1073.
118. Id.
119. Id. The defendant corporation allegedly participated in criminal Medicaid fraud.
120. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992).
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ment."' 2 ' Should it not follow that the party invoking the privilege has
the right to challenge the veracity of the information provided to make
the minimal extrinsic showing that would permit a magistrate or court to
intrude upon the privilege? The unilateral nature of the minimal extrin-
sic showing demonstrates a lack of understanding by courts of the need
to substantively evaluate the showing made by the party seeking to
defeat the privilege. By maintaining that it is sufficient for a district
court to hear from only the party seeking to defeat the privilege in
assessing the merit of the minimal showing, the Third Circuit com-
pletely dodged the question of what courts should and should not accept
as a qualitatively sufficient minimal showing.122 Without such consider-
ation, minimal showing emerges as an empty requirement.
A prima facie showing does not automatically admit the evidence
in question. The invoking party must still argue its fraud theory; and,
while employing all evidence reviewed in camera, the invoking party
must demonstrate both the exception's application and that the docu-
ments in question meet other evidentiary requirements, such as the rele-
vancy and prejudice requirements contained in Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.1
23
In instances where a party demonstrates a prima facie case using
extrinsic evidence, some courts permit disclosure automatically, without
verifying that each document requested satisfies the exception. 24 In
Haines, however, after finding a prima facie case, the district court
requested that a special master review each document of the 1500 docu-
ments in question to ascertain whether requiring the wholesale produc-
tion of all 1500 documents was too broad.' 25 Essentially, the special
master determined whether the crime-fraud exception required disclo-
sure of each individual document.
1 26
In Zolin, the Supreme Court faced a different procedural history
than that faced by the district court in Haines.t27 After defining guide-
lines lower courts should follow when determining whether to conduct
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Matter of Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622 (1988) (holding that the privilege may
remain if the party asserting privilege adequately rebuts the presumption created by the prima
facie showing). The Third Circuit in Haines similarly emphasized that the purportedly privileged
information must remain under seal until it is finally decided that the exception applies, and all
appropriate appellate remedies have been exhausted. Haines, 975 F.2d at 97.
123. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (1977) (holding that the prima
facie evidence was so overwhelming that the court required complete disclosure of all items
requested in an IRS summons).
125. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 697 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d
Cir. 1992).
126. Id.
127. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
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an in camera review of challenged materials for the purpose of finding a
prima facie case for their exclusion or admission, the Zolin Court
remanded the case to the intermediate appellate court for a determination
of whether, in light of the new guidelines, the district court's denial of in
camera review was clearly erroneous.1 28 Thus, the question of the quan-
tity of evidence giving rise to a reasonable belief emerges as the impor-
tant question once again.
Criminal crime-fraud exception invocations proliferate in the fed-
eral grand jury context. t 29 As Professor Fried explained:
Th[e] recent emphasis on white-collar crime presents prosecutors
with new temptations .... [ ]through use of the grand jury subpoena
power.... In all such investigations, the prosecutor.., is likely to
argue that the communications sought were in furtherance of the
crime or breach under investigation and therefore not privileged....
Although the United States attorney may be compelled to identify
which statutes' possible violation is the subject of a grand jury inves-
tigation, it is not possible to contest a subpoena on the ground that the
specific wrongdoing alleged is not prohibited by the statute cited.
Such a determination can only be made after indictment ... [and] the
target's attorney may be compelled to testify.'
30
Ultimately the question of "what happens" after determining the essence
of a prima facie case is contingent upon the forum and the decision.
A denial of the invocation of the exception for want of an initial
showing of fraud, or for want of a prima facie case, need not be the
death knell of the issue. Some courts preface their denials with the qual-
ification that if, at a later stage, the party attempting to defeat the privi-
lege can offer a greater showing, he may do so.13' Yet, in the event the
exception's advocate does not prevail below, the advocate will want to
preserve its right to appeal on the ground that the trial court's actions
were clearly erroneous.
On the other hand, if a court believes the exception's advocate has
established a prima facie case, that court's decision to require wholesale
production of the documents to opposing counsel may itself strike a
resounding blow. Even though a court must address relevancy and prej-
udice concerns under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prior to
128. Id. at 575.
129. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1227 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
130. Fried, supra note 8, at 473-74.
131. See Gagne v. Ralph Pill Elec. Supply Co., 114 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D. Me. 1987); cf
International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973). As
Professor Fried explained, "ITT was assuming the very thing to be proved: a review of the
communications would show that the defendant's attorneys had advised their client that the action
was without merit." Fried, supra note 8, at 476.
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admitting the critical documents into evidence, opposing counsel has
gained exposure to the documents' contents.' 3 2 This is particularly
problematic if the court does not painstakingly ensure that the crime-
fraud exception applies to each individual document. t 33 In addition, in
the context of the criminal defendant facing indictment, looser proce-
dural measures at the grand jury stage may facilitate disclosure of privi-
leged information, often from the defendant's counselor's own mouth,
even when the crime-fraud exception does not apply.
1 34
VI. CONCLUSION
To defeat attorney-client privilege, the current standards certainly
differ from those advanced by Justice Cardozo in Clark. While some
lesser evidentiary standard is needed in order to lift the seal of privilege,
at least for purposes of inspection by a court or magistrate, the need for a
prima facie showing derived completely from information independent
of the documents remains relevant. Ambiguities regarding the quantity
and quality of evidence satisfactory for a prima facie showing also
linger.
At the same time, in camera inspection is the least intrusive manner
in which the documents in question can be considered for purposes of
determining a prima facie showing. While ultimately non-disclosure to
any party, including a judge or magistrate, is most consistent with the
notion of Rule 501's attorney-client privilege, modern courts recognize
the need for a balance to ensure that the cloak of privilege is not prosti-
tuted to protect an improper purpose. Ultimately, the effects of the shift
from Justice Cardozo's stringent protection against the intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship to the Zolin balance can only be measured by
their impact upon client disclosures to attorneys. After Zolin, is the cli-
ent less inclined to properly inform his attorney for fear of the informa-
tion's disclosure? Perhaps the better question is whether the Zolin
132. One may infer that during the course of scrutinizing the documents in question and the
evidence offered to establish the need for an in camera review, a court also considers some
questions of relevancy and prejudice. On the other hand, a judge reserves judgment on relevancy
and prejudice concerns until the documents are actually before the court and a party is requesting
their admission.
133. In the Haines case, for example, there were at least five documents that the court deemed
not privileged in their entirety. The court mandated their disclosure, and in requiring a document-
by-document review by a new special master, the court attempted to protect against the disclosure
of truly privileged documents. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 680, 697 (D.N.J.),
vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
134. See United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983) (an example of abuse of the grand
jury process to derive privileged information in an instance where the crime-fraud exception was
never applicable).
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standard will deter clients from exploiting their relationships with their
attorneys if such exploitation is more readily discoverable.
ANN M. ST. PETER-GRIFFITH
